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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Improving the quality of care and quality of life for individuals with 
advanced, irreversible illness is a paramount goal from the perspectives of 
both ethics and public health. One aspect of achieving such improvement 
entails assuring that the care those individuals receive is consistent with their 
important, authentic, personal values and wishes.1 The physician and other 
professional members of the health care team are the experts on medical  
 
                                                 
*   Marshall B. Kapp, J.D., M.P.H., Director, Florida State University Center for 
Innovative Collaboration in Medicine & Law, Tallahassee, FL 
 1  This proposition is based on the fundamental ethical principle of autonomy. 
See Kathy L. Cerminara, The Law and Its Interaction With Medical Ethics in End-of-Life 
Decision Making, 140 CHEST  775 (2011); Deborah L. Volker & Hung-Lan Wu, Cancer 
Patients’ Preferences for Control at the End of Life, 21 QUALITY HEALTH RESOL. 1618 (2011) 
(examining the widely-shared value of patient autonomy in American culture). But see 
Gentian Vyshka & Jera Kruja, Inapplicability of Advance Directives in a Paternalistic Setting:  
The Case of a Post-Communist Health System, 12 BMC MED. ETHICS 12 (2011) (observing 
that patient autonomy is treated as a pernicious value in totalitarian regimes). 
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means to achieve specific outcomes, but the individual patient is the best 
expert about his or her own values, goals, and preferences.2 The quality of 
care and quality of life challenge is exacerbated by the fact that, as the 
medical and social ramifications of advanced illness unfold over time, many 
people receive care within several different settings, often moving back and 
forth among settings as their immediate needs and resources change. 
Consequently, it is imperative that the mechanisms we develop for the 
purpose of enforcing persons’ personal care values and preferences follow 
individuals across and throughout the care continuum. 
Many people with advanced, irreversible illness reach a point at 
which they need to receive most of their care in a nursing home,3 and a large 
proportion of those individuals ultimately die in that venue4 after receiving 
various forms of medical care there.5 The care actually provided to nursing 
home residents during the period prior to their deaths too frequently deviates 
from that which they, on the basis of their own values, really want.6 This 
article discusses one initiative—the Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining 
Treatment (POLST) paradigm—that holds the promise of improving the 
quality of care and quality of life for nursing home residents with advanced, 
irreversible illness by more closely reconciling the details of the actual care 
they receive at the most crucial juncture of their lives with their desired care 
in that context. 
The next section of this article provides background on the 
intersection of nursing homes and the care of people with advanced, 
                                                 
 2  J. Andrew Billings & Eric L. Krakauer, On Patient Autonomy and Physician 
Responsibility in End-of-Life Care, 171 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 849 (2011).  
 3  See, e.g., Mary E. Dellefield & Rebecca Ferrini, Promoting Excellence in End-
of-Life Care:  Lessons Learned From a Cohort of Nursing Home Residents With Advanced 
Huntington Disease, 43 J. NEUROSCI. NURSING 186 (2011) (explaining that many people with 
advanced Huntington Disease need to be cared for in a nursing home setting).  
 4  E.g., Steven C. Zweig et al., The Physician’s Role in Patients’ Nursing Home 
Care, 306 JAMA 1468, 1475 (2011) (indicating that 30% of Americans will die in nursing 
homes); Susan L. Mitchell et al., A National Study of the Location of Death for Older Persons 
With Dementia, 53 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 299 (2005). 
 5  Anita Bercovitz et al., End-of-Life Care in Nursing Homes:  2004 National 
Nursing Home Survey, NAT’L. No. 9 HEALTH STATISTICS REP. (Oct. 8, 2008). 
 6  See, e.g., Lauren W. Cohen et al., Family Perceptions of End-of-Life Care for 
Long-Term Care Residents with Dementia:  Differences Between the United States and the 
Netherlands, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 316 (2012) (noting inappropriate treatment of 
nursing home residents with dementia). The present article focuses solely on the nursing home 
context. The problem of medical interventions deviating from patients’ wishes in other health 
care settings has been discussed extensively elsewhere and is beyond the present scope of 
concern. See, e.g., John J. Mitchell, Jr., The Findings of the Dartmouth Atlas Project:  A 
Challenge to Clinical and Ethical Excellence in End-of-Life Care, 22 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 267 
(2011) (finding huge variations in the quantity and quality of medical care provided to 
critically ill Medicare beneficiaries across the United States, with the main determinant being 
the supply of services available in a particular geographic area); Jacqueline K. Yuen et al., 
Hospital Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders:  Why They Have Failed and How to Fix Them, 26 J. 
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 791 (2011) (documenting that many cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
attempts in hospitals would not have been desired by the patients involved).  
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irreversible illness. First, it outlines the importance of nursing homes within 
the contemporary American health care enterprise and then describes the 
ways in which medical care decisions are made today in this context and 
identifies some of the major shortcomings of the status quo.7 The ensuing 
section proposes the POLST paradigm as a viable alternative to the status 
quo, laying a foundation by setting forth information on the nomenclature, 
definition, and legal status of the POLST concept and then specifically 
exploring the adaptability of the POLST paradigm to the nursing home 
setting. The advantages of this mechanism as compared with conventional 
Advance Directives (ADs) are highlighted. The article concludes that 
POLST can and should be an integral facet of ideal nursing home care for all 
willing and appropriate residents. 
 
II.  NURSING HOMES AND THE CARE OF RESIDENTS WITH 
ADVANCED, IRREVERSIBLE ILLNESS 
 
A. Nursing Homes in the Contemporary American Health Care Enterprise 
 
Although tremendous strides have been made in recent years in 
shifting much of the care of older disabled people away from institutions and 
toward home and community-based environments,8 and that rebalancing was 
modestly further incentivized by the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA),9 
nursing homes nonetheless remain an important and inevitable component of 
the present and future American health care enterprise.10 Several factors 
                                                 
 7  The present article concentrates exclusively on nursing homes in the United 
States, but it is noteworthy that many of the same issues also arise in nursing homes in other 
countries. See, e.g., Elisabeth Gjerberg et al., Ethical Challenges in the Provision of End-of-
Life Care in Norwegian Nursing Homes, 71 SOC. SCI. MED. 677 (2010). 
 8  See H. Stephen Kaye, Gradual Rebalancing of Medicaid Long-Term Care 
Services and Supports Saves Money and Serves More People, Statistical Model Shows, 31 
HEALTH AFF. 1195, 1198 (2012); Donald L. Redfoot & Ari Houser, More Older People With 
Disabilities Living in the Community:  Trends From the National Long-Term Care Survey, 
1984–2004, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 2010); David C. Grabowski et al., Supporting 
Home- and Community-Based Care:  Views of Long-Term Care Specialists, 67 MED. CARE 
RES. & REV. 82S (2010).  
 9  Charlene Harrington et al., Medicaid Home- and Community-Based Services:  
Impact of the Affordable Care Act, 24 J. AGING & SOC. POL’Y 169 (2012). The Affordable 
Care Act (ACA), 124 Stat. 119 (2010), was upheld in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
 10  Mitchell H. Katz, There’s No Place Like Home, 171 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 
804, 804 (2011); NOELLE DENNY-BROWN ET AL., MONEY FOLLOWS THE PERSON 
DEMONSTRATION:  OVERVIEW OF STATE GRANTEE PROGRESS, JANUARY TO JUNE, 2011 xii 
(Mathematica Policy Research 2011), available at www.mathematica-
mpr.com/publications/pdfs/health/mfp_jan-jun2011_progress.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) 
(reporting a significant rate of temporary or permanent reinstitutionalization of previous 
nursing home residents back from community settings); Nancy A. Miller et al., A Profile of 
Middle-Aged and Older Adults Admitted to Nursing Homes:  2000-2008, 24 J. AGING & SOC. 
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place individuals at increased risk for nursing home admission, such as 
problems with independently carrying out multiple activities of daily living 
(ADLs), cognitive impairment, and prior nursing home use.11 Currently, 
there are approximately 15,600 federally certified nursing homes (skilled 
nursing facilities (SNFs) or nursing facilities (NFs)) operating in the United 
States,12 with slightly more than 1.6 million certified beds and approximately 
1.4 million residents on any given night.13 
 
An older person’s likelihood of living in a nursing home 
increases sharply with age. The share institutionalized 
remained [during 2006–2008] extremely low from ages 65–
69 (1.0%) and ages 75–79 (3.0%), then began to rise 
markedly, reaching 11.2% at ages 85–89, 19.8% at ages 90–
94, 31.0% at ages 95–99, and 38.2% at 100 years of age and 
older.14 
 
Beyond the demographics, the financial impact of nursing homes on 
the American economy is significant.15 Nursing home care commands major 
state and federal expenditures by Medicaid programs and out-of-pocket 
expenditures by residents and their families, with private long-term care 
insurance, Medicare, and private philanthropy playing important but much 
smaller financial roles.16 Of particular interest to the states: “[n]ursing home 
coverage is the fastest growing area of Medicaid coverage, and is likely to 
                                                                                                                   
POL’Y 271, 272 (2012) (noting that middle-aged adults with chronic medical and psychiatric 
problems are becoming an increasing share of the nursing home population).  
 11  Joseph E. Gaugler et al., Predicting Nursing Home Admission in the U.S.:  A 
Meta-Analysis, 7 BMC GERIATRICS 13 (2007). 
 12  American Health Care Association, Reimbursement and Research Department, 
Trends in Nursing Facility Characteristics 3 (2011), available at www.ahcancal.org/ 
research_data/trends_statistics/documents/trend_PVNF_Finalrpt_december.pdf. (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2013). These data are derived from the CMS Online Survey and Certification 
Reporting (OSCAR) data network.  Id. 
 13  Zweig et al., supra note 4, at 1475 (indicating that 30% of Americans will die 
in nursing homes). 
 14  Wan He & Mark N. Muenchrath, 90+ in the United States:  2006 -2008, 17 
AM. CMTY. SURVEY RPT. 15 (U.S. Census Bureau 2011).  
 15  See, e.g., Keith S. Goldfeld et al., Medicare Expenditures Among Nursing 
Home Residents With Advanced Dementia, 171 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 824, 827 (2011).  
 16  Kate A. Stewart et al., Annual Expenditures for Nursing Home Care:  Private 
and Public Payer Price Growth, 1977 to 2004, 47 MED. CARE 295, 295–301 (2009); Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE DATA, available at 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/index.html?redirect=/NationalHealthExpendData/ (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2013).  
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increase at a faster rate than ‘all health care expenditures, Medicare, 
Medicaid, and the national Gross Domestic Product.’”17 
 
B. Medical Decision Making and Care for Nursing Home Residents 
 
The legal environment surrounding medical decision making in the 
United States for individuals with advanced, irreversible illness has been 
evolving—not always in linear fashion18—since the 1976 Karen Anne 
Quinlan case19 brought the matter clearly into the public consciousness.20 
The present complex legal environment is largely a product of statutes 
enacted by Congress and individual state legislatures, particularly regarding 
ADs. However, statutes must be consistent with principles contained in the 
federal and various state constitutions.21 These foundational documents (as 
their provisions may be interpreted and applied by the courts to concrete fact 
situations) are Americans’ primary source of individual rights, as well as the 
primary constraint on governmental power regarding medical decision 
making.22 
The 1990 case involving Nancy Cruzan23 is the United States 
Supreme Court decision that decided the issue of discontinuing life-
prolonging medical treatment for a particular person.24 Ms. Cruzan was an 
automobile accident victim who was kept alive in a permanent vegetative 
state within a government (state of Missouri) long-term care facility, through 
the use of feeding and hydration tubes. Her parents asked that this 
intervention be discontinued, a request they believed was consistent with the 
                                                 
 17  Alexander N. Daskalakis, Public Options:  The Need for Long-Term Care, Its 
Costs, and Government’s Attempts to Address Them, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
181, 186 (2011). 
 18  See LOIS SHEPHERD, IF THAT EVER HAPPENS TO ME:  MAKING LIFE AND DEATH 
DECISIONS AFTER TERRI SCHIAVO 35–36 (2009) (describing the disruptive impact of the 
controversy surrounding the dying of Terri Schiavo). 
 19  In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 20  See, e.g., Phillip Kim, Navigating the Maze of End-of-Life Decisions Regarding 
the Rejection of Life-Sustaining Treatment, Medical Futility, Physician-Assisted Death, and 
Abortion, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 127 (2010).  
 21  Despite recent insinuations by President Obama to the contrary, the courts still 
possess the authority to invalidate legislation that conflicts with the federal and state 
constitutions. See Carrie B. Brown & Jennifer Epstein, Obama, the Left Take on the Supreme 
Court, POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2012), available at 
www.politico.com/news/stories/0412/74759.html; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  
 22  See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Justice O’Connor and the “Right to Die”:  
Constitutional Promises Unfulfilled, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 821 (2006); Jack Tuholske, 
Going With the Flow:  The Montana Court’s Conservative Approach to Constitutional 
Interpretation, 72 MONT. L. REV. 237 (2011) (discussing state constitutions as a source of 
individual rights to make medical decisions). 
 23  Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 24  Cf. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 734–36 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 
521 U.S. 793, 807-09 (1997) (rejecting a right under the U.S. Constitution to physician-
assisted death). This was a different question than was presented to the Court in Cruzan. 
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patient’s previously expressed (although not formally documented) wishes. 
The attending physicians refused to honor this request, and the Missouri 
Supreme Court denied the parents’ request to discontinue treatment. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that a mentally 
capable adult has a fundamental federal constitutional right, under the liberty 
guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause,25 to make 
personal medical decisions (even regarding refusal of artificial feeding and 
hydration) when death is expected to ensue shortly after the refusal. For 
patients with insufficient cognitive and emotional ability, however, the court 
ruled that the state’s legitimate interest in preserving life is strong enough to 
permit the state, if it so chooses, to require “clear and convincing” 
evidence—prior to following a surrogate’s discontinuation instructions—that 
the patient would want that treatment withdrawn if the patient were currently 
able to make and express an autonomous choice.26 Ordinarily, a written 
declaration made by the patient while the patient was still cognitively and 
emotionally capable would provide sufficient evidence of the patient’s 
treatment preference in the event of subsequent incapacity. Under the Cruzan 
decision, states also are free to set lower standards of proof than “clear and 
convincing” evidence for incapacitated patients, namely proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence (i.e., greater than a 50% likelihood), but not 
many states have chosen to avail themselves of this opportunity.27 
One form of treatment limitation around which there is by now 
substantial agreement is the Do-Not-Resuscitate order (DNR), also known as 
a Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation order (DNAR) or No Code order, which 
instructs caregivers not to initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) for a 
patient who suffers a foreseeable cardiac arrest. There have been very few 
reported legal decisions directly regarding this topic.28 Nonetheless, the 
prevailing rule is that a patient capable of making decisions has the right to 
                                                 
 25  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 26  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. 
 27  See, e.g., Bernadette Tuthill, Want to Terminate Life Support? Not in New 
York—Time to Give New Yorkers a Choice, 26 TOURO L. REV. 675 (2010) (explaining that the 
state of New York requires clear and convincing evidence before authorizing surrogates to 
withdraw medical treatment from a decisionally-incapacitated patient).  
 28  Nicole M. Saitta & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Wrongful Prolongation of Life—A 
Cause of Action That Has Not Gained Traction Even Though a Physician Has Disregarded a 
“Do Not Resuscitate” Order, 30 TEMP. J. SCI., TECH. & ENVTL. L. 221 (2011); Guardado v. 
Valley Medical Ctr., 2012 WL 1501271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (denying summary judgment 
in a lawsuit seeking to impose liability for failure to resuscitate); Jones v. Ruston La. Hosp., 
46,356–CW, 46,202–CW (La. App. 2 Cir. Aug. 10, 2011), 71 So. 3d 1154 (2011) (suit to 
impose liability for hospital’s failure to honor patient’s DNR order); Betancourt v. Trinitas 
Hosp., 1 A.3d 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (action to enjoin hospital from 
implementing a DNR order rendered moot by the patient’s death); Messenger v. Heos, 2008 
WL 5158901 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (claim for legal malpractice brought against attorneys 
who failed to pursue plaintiff’s claim against hospital for disobeying a DNR order for the 
plaintiff’s infant). 
6
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refuse CPR,29 and that surrogates may choose to forego CPR for a patient if 
the likely burdens of this intervention to the patient would seriously 
outweigh any expected benefits (such as mere continued existence until the 
next arrest).30 As with all medical decisions, a DNR order should be written 
by the physician only after a thorough consultation with the patient or 
surrogate and should be clearly documented in the medical record.31 A DNR 
order may be folded easily into a more comprehensive POLST document.32 
The most vigorously disputed issue in the treatment limitation arena 
is still the status of artificial feeding and hydration.33 The courts have been 
unanimous in holding that artificial feeding tubes (of all kinds) are merely 
another form of medical intervention that may be withheld or withdrawn 
under the same circumstances that would justify withholding or withdrawal 
of any other type of medical intervention such as a respirator, dialysis, or 
antibiotic use.34 Major medical professional groups endorse this position.35 
The contrary position is that feeding and hydration, even when they can be 
achieved only through tubes surgically or forcibly inserted into the patient’s 
body, are fundamentally different and more morally elemental than medical 
treatment, and therefore they should be maintained as long as they might 
keep the patient alive (that is, as long as they are not physiologically futile 
gestures).36 A number of state legislatures reflect this position in their living 
will or durable power of attorney statutes (discussed below), which are 
intended to severely constrain the rights of patients and surrogate decision 
                                                 
 29  Jeffrey P. Burns et al., Do Not Resuscitate Orders After 25 Years, 31 CRITICAL 
CARE MED. 1543 (2003).  
 30  Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act § 5 (1993).  
 31  Dan M. Westphal & Stefanie A. McKee, End-of-Life Decision Making in the 
Intensive Care Unit:  Physician and Nurse Perspectives, 24 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 222 (2009). 
But see Wendy G. Anderson et al., Code Status Discussions Between Attending Hospitalist 
Physicians and Medical Patients at Hospital Admission, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 359 
(2011) (documenting that code status is not discussed by physicians with many seriously ill 
patients); J.A. DePalma et al., “Slow” Code:  Perspectives of a Physician and Critical Care 
Nurse, 22 CRITICAL CARE NURS. Q. 89 (1999) (discussing the previous common practice of 
“slow” codes or “show” codes).  
 32  See infra Part III (discussing the POLST paradigm). 
 33  Jeannette Y. Wick & Guido R. Zanny, Removing the Feeding Tube:  A 
Procedure With a Contentious Past, 24 CONSULTANT PHARMACIST 874, 874–76 (2009) 
(describing the national debate surrounding the removal of artificial nutrition/hydration in the 
cases of Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and Terri Schiavo). 
 34  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 35  Robert D. Truog et al., Recommendations for End-of-Life Care in the Intensive 
Care Unit:  A Consensus Statement by the American Academy of Critical Care Medicine, 36 
CRITICAL CARE MED. 953 (2008).  
 36  See, e.g., Melanie Evans, Moral Obligations:  Catholic Officials Differ Over 
Vatican Feeding-Tube Rules, 37 MODERN HEALTHCARE 17, 17 (2007) (explaining the 
Vatican’s position on artificial nutrition and hydration, which states “[t]he administration of 
food and water even by artificial means is, in principle and ordinary and proportionate means 
of preserving life.”). 
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makers to authorize the removal of feeding tubes.37 Both the wisdom and the 
constitutionality of these purported restrictions are extremely questionable.38 
The federal Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) went into effect 
in 1991.39 The PSDA mandates that all nursing homes—as well as all 
hospitals, home health agencies, hospices, health maintenance organizations, 
and preferred provider organizations—participating in the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs engage in the following actions at the time a person is 
initially admitted or enrolled: (a) provide written information to individuals 
about their right to make their own medical decisions to the extent 
guaranteed by applicable state law, and make available to them the facility or 
organizational policy for effectuating that right for the facility’s or 
organization’s patients; (b) ask patients whether they have completed an AD 
already and, if the response is in the affirmative, have a system for recording 
the patient’s AD; (c) offer currently capable individuals a chance to execute 
an AD if they have not previously done so; (d) not discriminate in the 
provision of care based on the presence or absence of an AD; (e) create a 
system to assure compliance with relevant state laws on medical decision 
making; and (f) educate institutional or organizational staff and the 
community about patients’ rights pertaining to medical decision making.40  
When the patient or surrogate refuses aggressive, technologically 
intensive medical interventions, the physician nonetheless has the legal 
obligation to offer basic palliative (comfort, pain control, and emotional 
support) and hygiene measures.41 Failure to do so could constitute negligence 
or form the basis for professional discipline.42 Good palliative care may 
sometimes include the practice of palliative sedation to unconsciousness 
(also called total, terminal, or controlled sedation) for distress or suffering 
during the dying process that cannot otherwise be treated satisfactorily.43 
                                                 
 37  Tuthill, supra note 27, at 694. 
 38  Kathryn L. Tucker, The Campaign to Deny Terminally Ill Patients Information 
and Choices at the End of Life, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 495 (2009). 
 39  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. IV, §§ 
4206, 4751 (1990); see, e.g., LAWRENCE P. ULRICH, THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT:  
MEETING THE CHALLENGES IN PATIENT CARE (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Kevin Wildes 
eds., Georgetown University Press 1999).  
 40  Critiques of the effectiveness of the PSDA in practice are numerous. See, e.g., 
Catherine J. Jones, Say What? How the Patient Self-Determination Act Leaves the Elderly 
With Limited English Proficiency Out in the Cold, 13 ELDER L.J. 489 (2005); United States 
General Accounting Office, Patient Self-Determination Act: Providers Offer Information on 
Advance Directives but Effectiveness Uncertain (Aug. 1995).  
 41  See Sara L. Imhof & Brian Kaskie, Promoting a “Good Death”:  Determinants 
of Pain-Management Policies in the United States, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 907 (2008). 
 42  See Timothy McIntire, Ouch! That Really Hurts. Pain Management in the 
Elderly and Terminally Ill:  Is This a Legal or a Medical Problem? 6 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 151 
(2003).  
 43  Thaddeus M. Pope & Lindsey E. Anderson, Voluntarily Stopping Eating and 
Drinking:  A Legal Treatment Option at the End of Life, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 363, 378–80 
(2011); George P. Smith, II, Refractory Pain, Existential Suffering, and Palliative Care:  
Releasing an Unbearable Lightness of Being, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 469, 510–12 
8
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In every state, it is a criminal offense (as a form of homicide) for a 
physician to engage in positive or affirmative actions that are intended to 
speed up a patient’s death (such as administering a lethal injection), even if a 
competent patient voluntarily requests such action.44 Similarly, in every state 
except Oregon,45  Washington,46 Vermont,47 (and possibly Montana),48 it is 
criminal for a physician to go along with a patient’s request that the 
physician supply the patient with the means to hurry up his or her own death 
(such as writing a prescription for a lethal dose of a medication, knowing 
very well that the patient intends to commit suicide by taking that lethal 
dose).49 The Supreme Court has unanimously rejected the assertion that 
individuals have a federal constitutional right to obtain physician-assisted 
death (PAD).50 
Conversely, a patient, or more usually the patient’s family, may 
insist on initiating or continuing medical treatment (“doing everything 
possible”) that the clinician believes is futile in terms of patient benefit. 
Neither a patient nor a family (nor any other surrogate) possesses a legal 
right to demand, nor does a physician owe an enforceable duty to provide, 
nonbeneficial medical treatment.51 On the rare occasions when courts have 
become involved prospectively with the futility issue, the judicial opinions 
generally have been confusing, inconsistent, and poorly reasoned. However, 
most courts do not hold a provider liable after the fact for failure to begin or 
perpetuate futile interventions for a critically ill patient, even when the 
family was insisting on doing everything technologically possible.52 In 
                                                                                                                   
(2011) (citing the position statement of the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative 
Medicine); Richard A. Mularski et al., Pain Management Within the Palliative and End-of-
Life Care Experience in the ICU, 135 CHEST 1360 (2009); Norman L. Cantor, On Hastening 
Death Without Violating Legal and Moral Prohibitions, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 407, 418–22 
(2006). 
 44  Ruth C. Stern & J. Herbie Difonzo, Stopping for Death:  Re-framing Our 
Perspective on the End of Life, 20 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 387 (2009).  
 45  Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800 TO .-127 
(West).  
 46  Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.245.901 to 
.-70.245 (West 2012).  
 47  VT. STAT. § 5283 (West 2012). 
 48  Baxter v. State, 354 Mont. 234, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009). 
 49  Cyndi Bollman, A Dignified Death? Don’t Forget About the Physically 
Disabled and Those Not Terminally Ill:  An Analysis of Physician-Assisted Suicide Laws, 34 
S. ILL. U. L.J. 395, 399–400 (2010).  
 50  Washington, 521 U.S. at 702; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793.  
 51  Norman L. Cantor, No Ethical or Legal Imperative to Provide Life Support to a 
Permanently Unaware Patient, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 58 (2010); Robert D. Truog, Medical 
Futility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (2008–09); Mary Whitmer et al., Medical Futility:  A 
Paradigm as Old as Hippocrates, 28 DIMENSIONS CRIT. CARE NURS. 67 (2009).  
 52  Thaddeus M. Pope, Involuntary Passive Euthanasia in U.S. Courts:  
Reassessing the Judicial Treatment of Medical Futility Cases, 9 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 229, 
230 (2008) (arguing that “courts have generally neither prohibited nor punished the unilateral 
refusal of LSMT. Providers have regularly obtained both ex ante permission and ex post 
forgiveness for stopping LSMT without consent.”).  
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practice, clinicians usually seem to take the path of least resistance in such 
circumstances and “treat the family,” often out of misapprehension about 
potential liability exposure.53 In the vast majority of cases, better physician-
family communication (often assisted by the involvement of an institutional 
ethics committee), in which the realistic (that is, the negative) implications of 
“doing everything possible” are clearly delineated, can avoid or resolve 
serious disagreement over how best to proceed.54  
Over the past four decades, a lot of attention has been concentrated 
on advance or prospective health care planning as a mechanism for 
individuals to maintain a degree of control over their future medical 
treatment even if, at some point, they become physically or mentally 
incapable of making and expressing important decisions about their own 
care.55 Advocates of advance care planning also suggest that it may help 
people and their families avoid unwanted court involvement in medical 
treatment decisions,56 diminish the emotional or psychological stress on 
family and friends that occurs in difficult crisis circumstances,57 and 
conserve limited health care resources in a manner consistent with patient 
autonomy or self-determination.58 
Two chief types of advance directive legal mechanisms (ADs) are 
available for use in prospective health care planning. Statutes explicitly 
authorizing individuals to execute ADs have been enacted in every state; 
many of these state statutes (sometimes called “natural death acts”) are 
modeled on the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act adopted by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.59 In some other 
Western countries, such as England, the medical and legal establishments 
                                                 
 53  Thaddeus M. Pope, Surrogate Selection:  An Increasingly Viable, But Limited, 
Solution to Intractable Futility Disputes, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 183, 186–87 
(2010) (“Physicians are overwhelmingly reluctant to withhold or withdraw treatment without 
the consent of the authorized decision maker. Accordingly, without explicit permission to do 
otherwise, physicians generally comply with surrogate requests for treatment even when they 
think it is cruel and wrong.”). 
 54  Id., at 205; Thaddeus M. Pope, Physicians and Safe Harbor Legal Immunity, 
21 ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW 121, 132 (“Fortunately, most futility disputes are resolved 
consensually and informally.  Only rarely do they become intractable.”) Cf. Nancy N. Dubler, 
A “Principled Resolution”:  The Fulcrum for Bioethics Mediation, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
177 (2011) (describing the mediation of difficult bioethical disputes among family members 
and between them and health care providers). 
 55  See, e.g., Rebecca C. Morgan, The New Importance of Advance Directives, 2 
EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 1 (2009). 
 56  See David M. Shelton, Keeping End-of-Life Decisions Away from Courts After 
Thirty Years of Failure:  Bioethical Mediation as an Alternative for Resolving End-of-Life 
Disputes, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 103 (2008).  
 57  Id. at 2, 224 P.3d 1211 (“It is unlikely that a patient wants family members 
fighting over decisions regarding end of life treatment or wants special interests and 
government officials interceding in the determination and exercise of the patient’s wishes.”). 
 58  Lauren H. Nicholas et al., Regional Variation in the Association Between 
Advance Directives and End-of-Life Medicare Expenditures, 306 JAMA 1447 (2011).  
 59  Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (1993). 
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have broadly accepted ADs,60 although acceptance of the AD model has not 
been universally endorsed.61 
One legal advance planning mechanism is the proxy directive, 
usually a durable power of attorney (DPOA) for health care. The proxy 
directive is an AD that enables an individual to voluntarily designate another 
person—called a health care agent, surrogate, proxy, or attorney-in-fact—to 
make health care decisions in the event that the principal (the individual who 
has delegated away decision-making authority) subsequently loses decision-
making capacity. Many states have enacted statutes that designate a legal 
hierarchy of family members and other persons who may make decisions on 
behalf of patients incapacitated to make decisions when no guardian has been 
appointed or instruction directive (discussed below) has been written;62 in 
those jurisdictions, a DPOA may clarify which person has the authority to 
decide when two persons otherwise would have equal status (for example, 
the patient’s multiple adult siblings) within the hierarchy. Additionally, a 
DPOA is valuable when a person prefers to name a non-relative as the future 
decision maker. For instance, it is fairly common in the gay community for 
individuals to appoint domestic partners or friends, rather than family 
members, to act as their health care agents.63 
Unlike the situation created with an ordinary power of attorney, the 
authority of an agent under a DPOA is not automatically ended when the 
principal subsequently becomes incapacitated to make a decision. The 
agent’s decision making authority may become effective immediately (an 
immediate DPOA) upon execution of the document or it may “spring” into 
action when a specifically-delineated event (such as “when my physician 
certifies that I am unable to make my own medical decisions”) has taken 
place. The DPOA would then endure beyond that triggering event. The 
principal may terminate or revoke the arrangement at any time, so long as the 
principal remains mentally competent to do so. 
One limitation of the DPOA device is the legal and practical 
requirement that the principal, or person who would like to delegate certain 
decision making authority to an agent, actually have available a suitable, 
                                                 
 60  See, e.g., Samantha Halliday, Advance Decisions and the Mental Capacity Act, 
18 BRIT. J. NURS. 697 (2009); Catherine J. Bond & Karen Lowton, Geriatricians’ Views of 
Advance Decisions and Their Use in Clinical Care in England:  Qualitative Study, 40 AGE & 
AGEING 450 (2011); Tom Goffin, Advance Directives as an Instrument in an Ageing Europe, 
19 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 121 (2012).  
 61  See, e.g., Werner Gruber, Life and Death on Your Terms:  The Advance 
Directives Dilemma and What Should Be Done in the Wake of the Schiavo Care, 15 ELDER 
L.J. 503, 525–27 (2007) (describing the rejection of the living will model in Japan). 
 62  See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/25(a)(1) (West 2013) (providing, in 
order of priority, a list of family members and “close friend[s]” who may make decisions on 
behalf of an incapacitated patient who has not designated a “health care agent”). 
 63  Annick Persinger, Still Pioneers:  Special Social and Economic Hardships for 
Elderly Gays and Lesbians, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 151–52 (2010); Matthew T. 
Moore, Long-Term Plans for LGBT Floridians:  Special Concerns and Suggestions to Avoid 
Legal and Family Interference, 34 NOVA L. REV. 255, 272 (2009). 
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willing, and able person to whom to delegate that authority. The DPOA does 
not help people (the “unbefriended” population) who do not have someone 
else whom they can trust to make future personal decisions for them.64 
By contrast, an instruction (living will)-type AD documents an 
individual’s desires about wanted, limited, or unwanted life-sustaining 
medical treatments (LSMTs) in case the person at some point becomes 
cognitively or emotionally incapacitated or is unable to communicate 
treatment wishes at all. These instructions may be detailed (in the sense of 
relating to specific medical treatments in particular clinical situations), 
general (such as “no extraordinary or heroic measures”), or phrased in terms 
of a patient’s personal values (like “[k]eep me alive forever regardless of 
pain or expense” or “[j]ust don’t let me suffer”).65 
Proxy directives and instruction directives are not mutually 
exclusive. Some AD documents combine the instruction and proxy elements. 
Only a presently capable person may execute a valid AD. The AD becomes 
effective only when the person creating the AD subsequently lacks 
decisional capacity concerning a particular medical treatment question to be 
decided; if the patient currently possesses sufficient decisional capacity,66 
there is neither a need nor a right for health care providers to defer instead to 
an AD for advice. 
Courts and state legislatures have consistently made it clear that AD 
statutes are not intended to be the exclusive means by which patients may 
exercise the right to make future decisions about medical treatment.67 For 
example, a patient might convey concerns regarding future medical treatment 
orally to the physician during an office visit, with the physician documenting 
the patient’s words in the medical chart.68 When that person subsequently 
                                                 
 64  Naomi Karp & Erica Wood, Incapacitated and Alone:  Health Care Decision 
Making for Unbefriended Older People, HUMAN RTS. MAG. (2004), available at 
www.abanet.org/irr/hr/spring04/incapacitated.html (describing the challenges associated with 
medical decision-making in the context of incapacitated, “unbefriended” patients). 
 65  See, e.g., NORMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF 
DEATH WITH DIGNITY 54–71 (1993); Aging With Dignity, Five Wishes, available at 
http://www.agingwithdignity.org/five-wishes.php/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).  
 66  See Karin T. Kirchhoff et al., Effect of a Disease-Specific Advance Care 
Planning Intervention on End-of-Life Care, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 946 (2012) (reporting 
on a study finding that a majority of patients with congestive heart failure or end-stage renal 
disease continued to make their own decisions about care until the end of their lives).  
 67  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.106 (West 2012): 
The provisions of this chapter [Fla. Stat. § 765, authorizing individuals to 
execute ADs] are cumulative to the existing law regarding an individual’s 
right to consent, or refuse to consent, to medical treatment and do not 
impair any existing rights or responsibilities which a health care provider, 
a patient, including a minor, competent or incompetent person, or a 
patient’s family may have under the common law, Federal Constitution, 
State Constitution, or statutes of this state. 
See also, e.g., Stouffer v. Reid, 993 A.2d 104 (Md. 2010) (finding that competent adults have 
a constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical intervention).  
 68 E.g., TENN. CODE ANNOT. § 68-11-1806(a). 
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becomes unable to make personal medical decisions, his or her oral 
instructions are just as legally valid as would be a written document executed 
in compliance with all of the formalities contained in the state’s AD statute. 
Nonetheless, even though a legally valid AD may be oral, the patient’s 
treatment wishes are much more likely to be followed by the health care 
system if they are enshrined in a written document.69  
 
C. Problems With Advance Directives 
 
There are a myriad of serious problems with the legal status quo and 
the prevalent clinical practice that the legal climate helps to engender 
regarding the medical care of individuals with advanced, irreversible illness 
in the United States. There is a significant body of evidence that has been 
accumulated showing, too often, patients’ previously stated wishes 
concerning LSMT are not respected and implemented by health care 
providers, and very often also are not respected and implemented by families 
who are supposed to be acting as the patient’s surrogate. Individuals with 
advanced, irreversible illness frequently receive more aggressive medical 
treatment than they had earlier said they would want.70 These problems 
frequently specifically impact nursing home residents, their families, and 
their professional caregivers in negative ways, creating or exacerbating an 
unfortunate chasm between the values and wishes of the resident on one 
hand, and the actual care provided to that resident on the other. 
The primary problems discussed in this section are:  nursing home 
residents without ADs; disagreements concerning the interpretation and 
application of AD instructions; nursing home residents whose ADs do not 
follow them when they are transferred to a hospital, another nursing home, or 
a home- or community-based setting; and inadequate mechanisms to assure 
health care provider compliance with nursing home residents’ ADs.  
 
1. Residents Without Directives 
 
Despite substantial public attention, deep-seated psychological 
resistance to the contemplation of illness and death, coupled with inertia and 
legal complexities71 complicating the execution of an AD, keeps the rate of 
                                                 
 69  See, e.g., Erin Webley, Law, Insouciance, and Death in the Emergency Room, 
19 ELDER L.J. 257, 260 (2011) (describing personnel in the hospital emergency department 
ignoring the patient’s oral directive to withhold life-prolonging medical intervention). 
 70  Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough:  The Failure of the Living Will, 
34 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 30, 36–37 (2004).  
 71  See generally Lesley S. Castillo et al., Lost in Translation:  The Unintended 
Consequences of Advance Directive Law on Clinical Care, 154 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 121 
(2011).  
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AD completion discouragingly low among members of the general public.72 
Personal characteristics may influence AD completion rates among members 
of different population groups.73 Most critically ill patients have failed to 
formally designate a surrogate decision maker or express (let alone 
document) their preferences regarding life-sustaining medical treatments.74 
Nursing home residents are considerably more likely to complete an 
AD than community-dwelling older persons,75 no doubt in large part because 
the time of admission to a nursing home is a very teachable moment when 
the entering resident’s mind is keenly focused on the medical future. 
Nevertheless, the AD completion rate in nursing homes is still far less than 
perfect.76 The PSDA, while mandating at least some semblance of an 
advance planning inquiry, expressly forbids any health care provider from 
requiring a patient/resident to execute an AD as a condition of admission or 
receiving services77 and some residents choose not to take advantage of the 
AD opportunity. Additionally, a significant proportion of people who enter 
nursing homes are already seriously mentally compromised at the time of 
admission,78 and therefore probably are precluded from executing a valid 
legal document such as a medical AD.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 72  Gina Bravo et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of Interventions to Promote 
Advance Directives Among Older Adults:  A Systematic Review and Multi-Level Analysis, 67 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1122 (2008).  
 73  Manjula K. Tamura et al., Preferences for Dialysis Withdrawal and 
Engagement in Advance Care Planning Within a Diverse Sample of Dialysis Patients, 25 
NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION 237, 237 (2010). See also Amy S. Kelley et al., 
Determinants of Death in the Hospital Among Older Adults, 59 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 
2321, 2323–24 (2011) (finding that the black race and Hispanic ethnicity are correlates of in-
hospital death). But see James F. Lawrence, The Advance Directive Prevalence in Long-Term 
Care:  A Comparison of Relationships Between a Nurse Practitioner Healthcare Model and a 
Traditional Healthcare Model, 21 J. AM. ACAD. NURSE PRAC. 179, 182–83 (2009) (finding 
that black people and white people in the Evercare healthcare model, which relies heavily on 
the involvement of nurse practitioners, had similar rates of AD completion). 
 74  Sharon L. Camhi et al., Deciding in the Dark:  Advance Directives and 
Continuation of Treatment in Chronic Critical Illness, 37 CRITICAL CARE MED. 919 (2009). 
 75  Zweig et al., supra note 4, at 1475 (“The majority (65%) of nursing home 
residents have some form of advance directive and 56% have ‘do not resuscitate’ (DNR) 
orders.”).  
 76  Helaine E. Resnick et al., Advance Directives in Nursing Home Residents Aged 
> or = 65 Years:  United States 2004, 25 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE 476, 476 
(2008); Adrienne L. Jones et al., Use of Advance Directives in Long-Term Care Populations, 
NCHS Data Brief No. 54 1, 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db54.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
 77  42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(C) (2006).  
 78  See Kelly L. Moore et al., Age and Sex Variation in Prevalence of Chronic 
Medical Conditions in Older Residents of U.S. Nursing Homes, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 
756, 758 (2012) (documenting nursing home prevalence rates for dementia of 45% for men 
and 52% for women and for depression of 31% for men and 37% for women).  
14
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/3
2013] POLST IN THE NURSING HOME SETTING 165 
 
 
2. Interpretation and Application Disagreements 
 
Moreover, even when a jurisdiction’s advance directives law is clear 
and the patient has timely executed an instruction directive, health care 
providers and surrogates often are unclear about when the living will applies 
and are uncomfortable about deciding when a patient is on a dying trajectory 
that warrants triggering the declaration’s instructions. Also, health care 
providers sometimes find a living will’s instructions either too broad or too 
narrow to provide much useful guidance in a specific situation. 
 
Living wills have come under widespread criticism for either 
being badly written or not being sufficiently specific. 
Considering that many living wills are usually drafted far in 
advance of a person actually being ill, one wonders if there 
can ever be a sufficient degree of precision regarding the 
circumstances meant to be addressed. Complications arise 
when a living will is written in a manner that allows for 
multiple interpretations. . . . [S]uch unclear language may 
require interpretation from medical professionals and family 
members who may disagree. This becomes problematic 
when families or other surrogates ask for treatment that 
would not have been desired by the patient and/or is 
medically futile.79 
 
The ideal function of an instruction directive is to facilitate a meeting 
of the minds between the ill person and the health care team. However, 
misunderstandings about a directive’s true intent may be exacerbated by the 
reluctance of many physicians to engage patients in meaningful discussions 
about medical care goals and preferences in a timely manner.80 
 
3. Document Portability Problems 
 
Frequently, individuals with advanced, irreversible illness move over 
time from one health care or residential setting to another as their health and 
other circumstances constantly change. Hospitalized or community-dwelling 
                                                 
 79  Carolyn Standley & Bryan A. Liang, Addressing Inappropriate Care Provision 
at the End-of-Life:  A Policy Proposal for Hospitals, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 137, 147 
(2010). See also Donna A. Casey & David M. Walker, The Clinical Realities of Advance 
Directives, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 429, 439–40 (2011) (using a clinical vignette to illustrate the 
problems of interpreting and applying an AD to a specific set of facts).  
 80  Jennifer W. Mack et al., End-of-Life Care Discussions Among Patients With 
Advanced Cancer, 156 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 204, 207–09 (2012); Dorothy D. Nachman, 
Living Wills:  Is It Time to Pull the Plug?, 18 ELDER L.J. 289, 292 (2011) (“The goal in end-of-
life planning should be to encourage an open and honest conversation among the individual, 
his or her health care providers, and health care agent about the patient’s desires at end of 
life.”). 
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people may be admitted to nursing homes,81 and nursing home residents may 
be transferred—temporarily or until death occurs—to acute care hospitals82 
(generally through the emergency department)83 or other facilities as an 
individual’s provider-perceived84 needs appear to dictate. Financial 
incentives also play a role in encouraging hospital to nursing home 
transfers.85 Nursing home residents and their surrogates relatively rarely 
refuse such transfers when they are requested by attending physicians.86 The 
“patterns of transitions between nursing facilities, hospitals, and homes” 
have been described as “dynamic . . . , complex, interdependent, [and] 
longitudinal.”87 
Decisions about the initiation, continuation, withholding, or 
withdrawal of specific medical interventions may need to be made by 
physicians and other caregivers working within the facilities or home 
environments to which nursing home residents may be transferred. These 
decisions are not aided by ADs—even if the ADs are beautifully drafted—
when the documents do not physically (or electronically) follow the 
individual among different settings, and that therefore are not known and 
available to personnel in the transferee facilities or home settings in a timely 
manner. In theory, ADs are intended to be patient-specific rather than place-
specific, but in practice they often become lost or forgotten when the 
individual is transferred to a different setting from the nursing home or back 
to the nursing home from an alternative setting. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 81  See Emily R. Smith & Alan B. Stevens, Predictors of Discharges to a Nursing 
Home in a Hospital-Based Cohort, 10 J. AM. MED. DIR. ASS’N 623 (2009).  
 82  Masayo Sato et al., Residential and Health Care Transition Patterns Among 
Older Medicare Beneficiaries Over Time, 51 GERONTOLOGIST 170 (2011) (finding the most 
frequent transition pattern was transfer to the hospital and back to the nursing home); David 
C. Grabowski et al., Predictors of Nursing Home Hospitalization:  A Review of the Literature, 
65 MED. CARE RES. REV. 3 (2008).  
 83  Caroline E. Stephens et al., Emergency Department Use by Nursing Home 
Residents:  Effect of Severity of Cognitive Impairment, 52 GERONTOLOGIST 383 (2012). 
 84  Many of these transfers are criticized as unnecessary or inappropriate. See, e.g., 
Jane L. Givens et al., Hospital Transfers of Nursing Home Residents With Advanced 
Dementia, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 905 (2012) (finding that the majority of 
hospitalizations of nursing home residents with dementia are due to infections that could have 
been treated competently in the nursing home and that tube feeding complications account for 
almost half of all emergency department visits by nursing home residents when the tube 
feedings were questionable in the first place).  
 85  Muriel R. Gillick, How Medicare Shapes the Way We Die, 8 J. HEALTH & 
BIOMED. L. 27, 52 (2012).  
 86  Susan L. Mitchell et al., Decisions to Forgo Hospitalization in Advanced 
Dementia:  A Nationwide Study, 55 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 432 (2007). 
 87  Christopher M. Callahan et al., Transitions in Care for Older Adults With and 
Without Dementia,” 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 813, 817 (2012). 
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4. Enforcement Shortcomings 
 
State AD statutes specifically excuse a health care provider who 
decides, for reasons of personal conscience, not to carry out the explicitly 
stated treatment preferences of a patient or surrogate, so long as that provider 
does not impede efforts to have the patient transferred to the care of a 
different provider who is willing to respect the patient’s AD.88 These statutes 
embody a strong public policy interest in protecting the physician’s right of 
personal conscience,89 and are consistent with Section 7(E) of the Uniform 
Health Care Decisions Act,90 although they have inspired complaints that 
“advance directive statutes meant to protect patients’ right of self-
determination may instead better protect physicians from punitive action.”91 
In the same vein, courts have declined to hold health care providers liable for 
failure to follow a patient’s or surrogate’s instructions to withdraw or 
withhold particular forms of treatment,92 often on the grounds that providing 
life-prolonging intervention can never cause the sort of cognizable injury or 
harm for which the tort system is designed to provide monetary 
compensation.93 These conscience-based statutes and judicial decisions 
would apply with full force in the nursing home context. 
Physician noncompliance with patient wishes to limit medical 
interventions that have been expressed in ADs sometimes happens,94 
especially when physician anxiety (ordinarily ungrounded but sincere) about 
potential negative legal repercussions takes over the situation.95 Those 
                                                 
 88  E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.06 (West 2012).  
 89  See generally Don R. Castleman, Conflict of Conscience:  Refusal of a Health 
Care Provider to Withdraw Life Support, 3 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 175, 191 (2011); 
Peter D. Jacobson & Soniya K. Mathur, Health Law 2010 :  It’s Not All About the Money, 36 
AM. J. L. & MED. 389, 398 (2010); Stephen Wear & Susan Lagaipa, Toleration of Moral 
Diversity and the Conscientious Refusal of Physicians to Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment, 
19 J. MED. & PHIL. 147, 153 (1994).  
 90  See 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 83 (2006). 
 91  Castillo et al., supra note 71, at 125.  
 92  E.g., Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr. (Bartling II), 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 
(Ct. App. 1986); Scheible v. Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Ctr., Inc., 988 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2008). But see Thaddeus M. Pope, Nonconsensual Provision of Life-Sustaining 
Treatment:  Civil, Criminal, and Disciplinary Sanctions, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. (In 
Press 2013).  
 93  Cronin v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 875 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); 
Saitta, supra note 28.  
 94  See Nachman, supra note 80, at 303 (“While physicians generally view the use 
of advance directives positively, their professional actions indicate some reluctance to fully 
respect the decisions of patients regarding their end-of-life care decision making. Frequently 
patients’ or surrogates’ wishes are merely one factor considered by physicians in making 
treatment decisions at the end of life.”). The other side of the coin—individuals and families 
who demand medical treatments that the physician believes to be clinically and ethically 
futile—has spawned an enormous quantity of literature, a discussion of which is beyond the 
scope of the present article. 
 95  See Casey, supra note 79, at 441 (describing a clinical scenario in which, 
contrary to their father’s AD, a patient’s daughters continued to demand dialysis, invasive 
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anxieties reinforce the general philosophical biases in favor of aggressive 
action and against acceptance of the limits of medicine that still animate 
much of the modern medical enterprise.96 Entreaties by patient advocates for 
judicial recognition of a cause of action for “wrongful living” when an 
individual’s treatment wishes as expressed in an AD are not respected by the 
care providers have thus far gone unheeded.97 
 
III.  THE POLST ALTERNATIVE 
 
A. Background 
 
“The evolution of advance directives has mirrored that of many new 
medical technologies:  initial unbridled enthusiasm evolved into skepticism 
as empirical evidence raised questions about the current practice, followed 
by a wiser, more constrained application.”98 Growing frustration with the 
inherent limitations of existing instruments for promoting the prospective 
autonomy of patients with advanced, irreversible illness who may become 
incapacitated to make a decision99 has led many attorneys, health care 
providers, and commentators to advocate as the next step in the evolution of 
health care advance planning law and policy the use of POLST (Physician 
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment) forms.100 From a variety of 
perspectives, the POLST paradigm offers a number of opportunities for 
going beyond the status quo, including our present strong reliance on ADs, to 
                                                                                                                   
catheters, and other aggressive treatments). The authors comment, “The unfortunate result of 
this type of conflict is that healthcare professionals give more authority for decision making to 
families than to advance directives, mostly out of fear of potential litigation from surviving 
family members.” Id.; Nachman, supra note80, at 292 (ascribing the failure of ADs primarily 
to the incompatibility of their two distinct goals of “protecting an individual’s right to 
determine the nature and scope of their (sic) end-of-life care and protecting health care 
professionals from liability”).  
 96  See Daniel Callahan, End-of-Life Care: A Philosophical or Management 
Problem?, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 114, 115 (2011).  
 97  Holly F. Lynch et al., Compliance With Advance Directives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 
133, 139 (2008).  
 98  Douglas B. White & Robert M. Arnold, The Evolution of Advance Directives, 
306 JAMA 1485, 1485 (2011); see also Charles P. Sabatino, The Evolution of Health Care 
Advance Planning Law and Policy, 88 MILBANK Q. 211 (2010).  
 99  But see Benjamin H. Levi & Michael J. Green, Too Soon to Give Up:  Re-
examining the Value of Advance Directives, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3 (2010) (arguing against the 
abandonment of ADs just yet).  
 100  The exact nomenclature varies among different jurisdictions; some states, for 
instance, use the language of MOLST, or Medical Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment. 
Patricia Bomba, Landmark Legislation in New York Affirms Benefits of a Two-Step Approach 
to Advance Care Planning Including MOLST:  A Model of Shared, Informed Medical 
Decision-Making and Honoring Patient Preferences for Care at the End of Life, 17 WIDENER 
L. REV. 475 (2011). 
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potentially improve the care of individuals with advanced, irreversible 
illness.101 
Unlike a traditional AD executed by a patient while still capable of 
making decisions, POLST entails a medical order written by a physician102 
(with the concurrence of the patient or surrogate)103 instructing other health 
care providers such as emergency medical squads104 about the treatment of a 
patient with advanced, irreversible illness under specific factual 
circumstances. “The POLST form is a more uniform, comprehensive, and 
portable method of documentation of patients’ end-of-life treatment desires. 
Although the POLST form is not intended to replace ADs executed by 
patients, it corrects many of the inadequacies of current forms and intends to 
lessen the discrepancy between a patient’s end-of-life care preferences and 
the treatment(s) eventually provided by the patients’ health care 
providers.”105 
At least sixteen states have formally implemented the POLST 
Paradigm, with national coordination efforts being administered through the 
Center for Ethics in Health Care at the Oregon Health & Science 
University.106 Many more states are in the process of developing and 
implementing their own versions of POLST.107  
 
B. Adapting POLST for Nursing Home Residents 
  
Some nursing homes already participate in POLST programs.108 
Experience thus far with the use of the POLST approach for nursing home 
residents with advanced, irreversible illness indicates that residents for whom 
                                                 
 101  See Thaddeus M. Pope & Melinda Hexum, Legal Briefing:  POLST:  Physician 
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 23 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 353 (2012); Keith E. Sonderling, 
POLST:  A Cure for the Common Advance Directive—It’s Just What the Doctor Ordered, 33 
NOVA L. REV. 451 (2009). 
 102  Although this article discusses POLST exclusively as a physician’s order, some 
states also permit advanced nurse practitioners and physicians’ assistants to write the order. 
See CHARLES P. SABATINO & NAOMI KARP, IMPROVING ADVANCED ILLNESS CARE:  THE 
EVOLUTION OF STATE POLST PROGRAMS 29–35 (2011).  
 103  There is variation among jurisdictions regarding whether the patient or 
surrogate, in addition to the physician, must sign the POLST form for it to be legally effective. 
Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 875 N.Y.S.2d at 10–11. 
 104  See Stanley Sam et al., Survey of Emergency Medical Services Professionals’ 
Experience With Advance Directives and Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 59 J. 
AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 2383 (2011).  
 105  Sara Catherine Spillers & Brittany Lamb, Is the POLST Model Desirable for 
Florida?, 8 FLA. PUB. HEALTH REV. 80, 82–84 (2011). 
 106  See generally POLST, www.polst.org (last visited June 27, 2013).  
 107  See, e.g., FLORIDA POLST, http://med.fsu.edu/medlaw/POLST (last visited 
June 27, 2013) (providing materials describing the Florida POLST effort). 
 108  Helaine E. Resnick et al., Nursing Home Participation in End-of-Life 
Programs:  United States, 2004, 26 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE 354, 354 (2009) 
(finding that, in 2004, 13.3% of surveyed nursing homes were participating in a POLST 
program).  
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POLSTs have been written are significantly more likely to have care 
provided to them that is consistent with their authentic personal values and 
wishes.109 This contrasts with the disjuncture between actual and desired 
medical interventions often witnessed in the absence of a POLST, even when 
the individual has executed an AD. Health care professionals ordinarily are 
used to, and reasonably comfortable with, respecting physicians’ orders. 
Thus, a POLST is more likely than an AD to be honored by health care 
professionals within nursing homes,110 as well as more likely to be honored 
across care settings as the individual is transferred from setting to setting 
within the continuum of care.111 
 
Because a POLST becomes part of a patient’s medical 
record, the form is meant to travel with the patient between 
health care facilities. This documentation is helpful in 
situations such as emergency care [when a nursing home 
transfers a resident to the hospital] when the health care 
provider may be unfamiliar with the patient. The POLST 
then allows a receiving physician to follow medical orders 
regarding the patient’s end-of-life wishes without the need 
for repeated questioning regarding life-sustaining 
treatment.112 
 
Moreover, nursing home residents for whom POLSTs have been 
written are less likely to be transferred out the nursing home to another 
health care setting.113 Those residents, therefore, are more likely to ultimately 
die in their own familiar, supportive nursing home surrounding, rather than 
in a hospital.114 As explained by a commentator: 
                                                 
 109  Susan E. Hickman et al., A Comparison of Methods to Communicate Treatment 
Preferences in Nursing Facilities:  Traditional Practices Versus the Physician Orders for 
Life-Sustaining Treatment Program, 58 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1241, 1247 (2010). 
 110  Susan E. Hickman et al., The Consistency Between Treatments Provided to 
Nursing Facility Residents and Orders on the Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment 
Form, 59 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 2091, 2094–97 (2011); Judy L. Meyers et al., Physician 
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment Form, 30 J. GERONT. NURS. 37, 43 (2004). But see Karin 
T. Kirchhoff et al., Effect of a Disease-Specific Advance Care Planning Intervention on End-
of-Life Care, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 946 (2012) (claiming that most patients in this 
study either received the care they desired at the end of life or altered their preferences to be in 
accord with the care they could receive).  
 111  See Janet L. Abrahm, Advances in Palliative Medicine and End-of-Life Care, 
62 ANN. REV. MED. 187, 196–97 (2011) (promoting POLST as a major advance because of the 
document’s portability across different care settings). 
 112  Kathryn L. Tucker, When Dying Takes Too Long:  Activism for Social Change 
to Protect and Expand Choice at the End of Life, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 109, 134–35 (2011). 
 113  See, e.g., Aram Dobalian, Nursing Facility Compliance With Do-Not-
Hospitalize Orders, 44 GERONTOLOGIST 159, 163 (2004) (finding that nursing home residents 
with DNH orders were half as likely to be hospitalized as those without such orders).  
 114  An Vandervoort et al., Advance Directives and Physicians’ Orders in Nursing 
Home Residents With Dementia in Flanders, Belgium:  Prevalence and Associated Outcomes, 
20
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/3
2013] POLST IN THE NURSING HOME SETTING 171 
 
 
The hospital is the worst place to put dying people. These 
patients are unable to recognize relatives, confined to bed, 
and can’t swallow. In the hospital, tubes and machines may 
keep them alive for weeks or months. Is this the care and 
dignity you want to give your loved one?115 
 
Additionally, POLSTs enable greater precision (and hence, less 
ambiguity) in the specification of prospective treatment orders. For example, 
according to one commentator:  
 
CPR and the order to forgo it, the DNR order, have taken on 
a constellation of important symbolic meanings that are 
often different to patients, their families, and the healthcare 
team. These disparate meanings can then serve to hijack 
discourse about prognosis and the possibility of actual 
therapies…and instead encourage an all-or-nothing approach 
informed by the hypothetical of future resuscitation.116 
 
Nonetheless, many individuals with DNR orders do, in fact, request 
that certain other forms of life-sustaining medical intervention be attempted, 
while people who want CPR to be attempted in the event of a 
cardiopulmonary arrest usually want less than “everything” to be attempted 
for them.117 The POLST provides a mechanism to effectuate those specific 
preferences. In a related illustration of the precision possible in a POLST: 
 
The POLST form offers an advantage over traditional do-
not-hospitalize orders, because it includes orders for 
hospitalization when comfort needs cannot be met in the 
current care setting and also allows for hospitalization while 
opting out of more-aggressive ICU [intensive care unit] care. 
Residents with POLST forms [in this study] who desired full 
                                                                                                                   
24 INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRIC 1133, 1141 (2012) (finding that the chances of dying in a hospital 
were lower if there was a General Practitioner’s (GP) order (the European counterpart to the 
POLST)); Bernard J. Hammes et al., The POLST Program:  A Retrospective Review of the 
Demographics of Use and Outcomes in One Community Where Advance Directives Are 
Prevalent, 15 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 77, 83 (2012).  
 115  Carl Hammerschlag, Die With Dignity, 31 CARING 54 (2012). 
 116  Daniel J. Braunner, Later Than Sooner:  A Proposal for Ending the Stigma of 
Premature Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 59 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 2366, 2366 (2011).  
 117  Susan E. Hickman et al., Use of the Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining 
Treatment Program in Oregon Nursing Facilities:  Beyond Resuscitation Status, 52 J. AM. 
GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1424, 1429 (2004); Erik K. Fromme et al., Research Letter:  POLST 
Registry Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders and Other Patient Treatment Preferences, 307 JAMA 34, 
34 (2012) (“Thus, half of patients with DNR orders would want to be transported to the 
hospital if indicated, and half would not unless comfort needs could not be met in their current 
location.”).  
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treatment received the same level of treatment as residents 
without POLST forms.118 
 
This opportunity for greater specificity on the POLST form makes it 
more probable that the patient’s authentic values and preferences will be 
carried out in practice, either in the nursing home or within the hospital or 
other setting to which the erstwhile nursing home resident has been 
transferred. 
Another potentially beneficial facet of the POLST paradigm is 
reduction in the emotional stress placed upon the nursing home resident’s 
family members and friends in their capacity as proxy or surrogate for the 
currently incapacitated individual.119 The presence of a clear POLST reduces 
the likelihood that aggressive medical intervention will be initiated or 
continued by default because a surrogate feels psychologically bound to ask 
for “everything” when the patient’s preferences are not precisely known.120 
In the absence of a clear expression of the presently incapacitated 
individual’s treatment preferences about future care, made while that person 
was still capable of decision-making, there is evidence that surrogates are 
rather unreliable predictors or reflectors of what the patient would have 
selected for himself or herself.121 By providing a high degree of clarity, based 
upon the patient’s timely prior input, a POLST can reduce the discordance 
between surrogate and patient decisions and the emotional strain for the 
surrogate engendered by the need to make treatment choices largely in the 
dark.122 
Attempts to implement a successful POLST paradigm program for 
nursing home residents face several particular challenges. One challenge 
concerns medical care continuity; when an individual is admitted to a nursing 
home, frequently that person’s primary care is taken over by a new physician 
(who may be under contract as the facility’s Medical Director) because the 
physician who had been providing primary care in the community does not 
continue his or her caregiving relationship with the resident after nursing 
                                                 
 118  Hickman et al., supra note 9, at 1747.  
  119 See, e.g., David Wendler & Annette Rid, Systematic Review:  The Effect on 
Surrogates of Making Treatment Decisions for Others, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 336, 
343–34 (2011).  
 120 Ursala K. Braun & Laurence B. McCullough, Preventing Life-Sustaining 
Treatment by Default, 9 ANNALS FAM. MED. 250, 254 (2011).  
 121  See, e.g., Liat Ayalon et al., Preferences for End-of-Life Treatment:  
Concordance Between Older Adults With Dementia or Mild Cognitive Impairment and Their 
Spouses, 24 INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS 1798 (2012). 
 122  See Brenna Kelly et al., Systematic Review:  Individuals’ Goals for Surrogate 
Decision-Making, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 884 (2012) (documenting that two of the 
primary goals of individuals regarding surrogate decision making during times of decisional 
incapacity are being treated consistently with one’s own treatment preferences and reducing 
the burden on their families).  
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home admission has taken place.123 Another set of challenges concerns 
physician availability.124 There generally is much less active physician 
presence in nursing homes than in acute care hospitals, and time pressure is 
the most commonly cited barrier to the conduct of the type of extensive, 
thoughtful physician or nursing and resident/family (or other surrogate) 
conversations that the POLST paradigm ideally envisions.125 
In the circumstance of nursing home residents with advanced, 
irreversible illness who are transferred to a hospital or other health care 
setting despite the presence of a POLST, the portability of the document—
the POLST physically or electronically accompanying the person in real 
time—is a challenge that has been discussed already. Apprehensions about 
potential adverse legal repercussions permeating the minds of physicians and 
other health care providers is another challenge to enthusiastic POLST 
support that was mentioned earlier. These challenges are exacerbated in the 
nursing home arena, which is surrounded by an especially complex and 
adversarial regulatory and litigation climate.126 
One of the most substantial challenges is lack of knowledge about 
POLST, its conceptual underpinnings, and the practical details of 
implementation, on the part of nursing home personnel.127 Because the 
POLST paradigm can and should be integrated significantly into the nursing 
home setting, and indeed many POLSTs are initiated in the nursing home, 
information and exercises on this subject matter for staff at all levels (since 
staff at all levels interact with residents and their families) should regularly 
be provided as part of each facility’s in-service continuing education 
endeavors.128 For instance, it is important that physicians and other staff 
understand how to present the POLST concept to residents and their families 
straightforwardly as a voluntary option rather than as a mandatory 
requirement.129 At the same time, nursing homes should utilize their resident 
                                                 
 123  See Zweig et al., supra note 4, at 1474 (“Most nursing home residents are 
cared for by family physicians, general internists, and geriatricians who work part-time in the 
nursing home.”); Paul R. Katz et al., Nursing Home Physician Specialists:  A Response to the 
Workforce Crisis in Long-Term Care, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 411 (2009).  
 124  Zweig et al., supra note 4, at 1474 (“Physicians are rarely present in the 
nursing facility when residents become acutely ill.”); Meyers et al., supra note 110, at 43 
(indicating “concerns about physicians’ accessibility for end-of-life discussions”).  
 125  Anthony J. Caprio et al., Health Care Professionals’ Perceptions and Use of 
the Medical Orders for Scope of Treatment (MOST) Form in North Carolina Nursing Homes, 
13 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS ASS’N. 162, 165 (2012). 
 126  See Marshall B. Kapp, The Liability Environment for Physicians Providing 
Nursing Home Medical Care:  Does It Make a Difference for Residents?, 16 ELDER L.J. 249, 
251–52 (2009). 
 127  See Caprio, supra note 125, at 162–63. 
 128  Meyers et al., supra note 110, at 44; Neil S. Wenger et al., Implementation of 
Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment in Nursing Homes in California:  Evaluation 
of a Novel Statewide Dissemination Mechanism, 28 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 51 (2012). 
 129  See Fromm et al., supra note 117, at 34. 
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councils and family councils130 as structural vehicles to educate their 
residents and families about the POLST paradigm option. 
Despite a jurisdiction-specific statutory or regulatory overlay, each 
institutional nursing home will likely retain substantial discretion about how 
POLSTs written by physicians for residents they serve are to be reconciled 
and integrated with existing institutional bylaws and protocols regarding the 
treatment of persons with advanced, irreversible illness. For example, will 
the institutional provider presently caring for a particular resident recognize 
and act upon a POLST signed by a physician who earlier cared for that 
individual in the community or in another institutional provider, but who 
does not have active admitting and treating privileges within the current 
provider? Conversely, will the nursing home limit its recognition of POLSTs 
to those that are written by physicians who are members of that nursing 
home’s medical staff? In a connected vein, even if state law permits non-
physicians to write POLSTs in consultation with patients or their surrogates, 
would any particular nursing home elect to recognize and implement a 
POLST written by a non-physician? 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
As stated eloquently by one commentator:  
 
[I]f our society fervently believes that self-determination at 
the end of life is a hallmark of an evolved society, health 
care professionals, attorneys, and legislatures have a duty to 
work together to develop a clear and consistent process that 
allows clients and patients to choose their end-of-life care 
options with the confidence that their choices will satisfy 
underlying statutory law and hospital policies while 
supporting patient autonomy. By working together, 
professionals can understand the complex concerns of the 
other and work in tandem to create a reliable process that 
lawyers, doctors, and hospitals can accept to support the 
dying patient.131 
 
As we engage in innovative, inter-professional collaboration in 
pursuing the goal of assuring that individuals with advanced, irreversible 
illness receive until the end of their lives the health care most consistent with 
their basic values and preferences, promoting and implementing the POLST 
paradigm should be prominently on the agenda. Further, those POLST-
related efforts ought to go beyond the hospital and home-based settings, to 
                                                 
 130  See generally Donna R. Lenhoff, LTC Regulation and Enforcement, 26 J. 
LEGAL MED. 9, 30 (2005) (explaining the value of resident and family councils). 
 131  Nachman, supra note 80, at 293. 
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include attention to the important nursing home venue, where many people 
who can benefit from POLST will—and should—spend their final days. 
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